P R E P A R A T O R Y  C O M M I S S I O N  F O R  T H E
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION (CTBTO)
P R O V I S I O N A L  T E C H N I C A L  S E C R E T A R I A T

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# Statement by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann

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Mr. President, distinguished delegates,

1. I am pleased to be here today to report on the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, is one of the cornerstones of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Its total ban of any nuclear test explosions in any environment will help end the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons, as well as arresting the proliferation of these weapons.

2. In view of the terrorist attacks on 11 September, the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has acquired a new urgency. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it in his opening address to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT only three weeks ago, "Those events should have made it clear to everyone that we cannot afford further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nor can we afford to lose momentum in efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. We must do everything we can to reduce the risk of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists."

3. Since my first address to the General Assembly on 30 October 2000, I am pleased to inform you that the Treaty has been signed by four additional States and ratified by a further 23, one of which was an Annex 2 State – one of the 44 States listed in the Treaty whose ratifications are required for its entry into force. Today the Treaty has been signed by a total of 164 States and ratified by 89. Thirty-one of these ratifications are by Annex 2 States. The level and pace of signatures and ratifications indicates the firm support of the international community for the Treaty.

4. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was established five years ago to carry out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and to prepare for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. The Commission focuses its activities in two key areas: the establishment of the global verification regime to monitor Treaty compliance and the promotion of signature and ratification.

5. As at 1 December 2001, the PTS comprises 266 staff members from 68 countries with the percentage of women in the Professional category having reached 27.9%. Total budgetary resources approved for the financial years 1997-2002 amount to some US$ 408 million. Most of these resources have been dedicated to verification related activities; in 2000-2001, only 18.5% of the total resources were allocated to administrative and other non-verification-related programmes.

6. A key activity of the Commission is the establishment of a global verification regime to monitor Treaty compliance. This regime needs to be operational at the Treaty's entry into force. It will be capable of detecting nuclear explosions underground, in water and in the atmosphere. The verification regime comprises four elements:
   - The International Monitoring System (IMS), with the International Data Centre (IDC), will be able to detect evidence of possible nuclear explosions;

- A consultation and clarification process can clarify and resolve matters concerning possible non-compliance with the Treaty;
- States Parties will also have the right to request an on-site inspection to determine whether a nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty, and to gather facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator; and lastly
- Confidence-building measures will contribute to resolve compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data and to assist in the calibration of IMS stations.

7. The International Monitoring System (IMS) consists of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories that monitor the Earth for evidence of a nuclear explosion. The IMS uses seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring technologies to detect possible nuclear explosions. Radionuclide monitoring technologies collect and analyse air samples for evidence of the physical products created by nuclear explosions. Progress in establishing these facilities has been good considering the engineering challenges that face the establishment of this first worldwide monitoring network. Over 270 site surveys have been completed. Twenty-two of the primary seismic stations, 75 of the auxiliary seismic stations, three hydroacoustic stations, 12 infrasound stations and 17 radionuclide stations have been completed. These stations now substantially meet the specifications necessary for their certification as part of the IMS network.

8. A Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) carries the seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide data from IMS facilities to the International Data Centre. This global satellite communications network is also used to distribute data and reports relevant to Treaty verification to the States Signatories. Transmitted data are authenticated against tampering. As at the end of October this year, some 65 IMS stations were linked to the GCI, some directly and some through one of seven independent sub-networks.

9. The International Data Centre supports the verification responsibilities of States Signatories by providing the products and services needed for effective Treaty monitoring. The Centre receives raw data from monitoring stations around the world, which it processes, analyses and transmits to States for final analysis. Improved software is enhancing precision in locating the events which produce seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide data, and the verification system as a whole is being continuously developed and refined.

10. On-Site Inspections as provided for in the Treaty are a final verification measure, and the development of a draft OSI Operational Manual is a key task for the Preparatory Commission. The Commission is also acquiring inspection equipment and building up a pool of potential inspectors.

11. The overarching aim of the Treaty is to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and to enhance international peace and security. However, the infrastructure and technology used to collect, transmit, process and analyse verification data, together with the data themselves, could provide

States with significant scientific and civil advantages. The verification regime provides a comprehensive set of information about the Earth's crust, seas and atmosphere. Seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound data can be used in studies of the Earth's structure and for research on earthquakes, volcanic eruption forecasting, tsunami warnings, underwater event location, and sea temperature and climate change monitoring. The data can assist in minimizing the effect of volcanic eruptions on civil aviation and can be used for oceanic swell research and atmospheric and meteorological studies. Radionuclide technologies offer opportunities for detecting radionuclide dispersion, monitoring radiation levels and studying natural radioactivity, as well as supporting atmospheric studies, biological research and environmental change tracking.

12. The Preparatory Commission promotes information-sharing through international cooperation workshops and other activities designed to further Treaty understanding, such as the Experts Communication System (ECS), a password-protected web site which offers States-designated registered users effective and prompt access to internal discussions and documents of the Preparatory Commission. The States are also offered training courses and workshops in IMS, IDC and On-Site Inspection (OSI) technologies, thereby assisting in the upgrading of their national scientific capabilities in related areas.

Mr. President,

13. On 15 June 2000, the General Assembly adopted the Agreement to regulate the relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, thereby accepting the Preparatory Commission as a new member of the United Nations family. The Commission remains an independent international organization, but has been given formal status by which we can contribute to the goals of the United Nations. CTBTO staff use the UN Laissez-Passer on duty travel. We have concluded a services agreement with UNDP which provides us with operational support. Our Liaison Office, situated in the United Nations buildings across the street here in New York, contributes to the implementation of the relationship agreement with the UN and liaises with the United Nations Secretariat and other agencies of the UN system, the offices of regional, intergovernmental or relevant non-governmental organizations, as well as with the delegations in New York.

14. Under this Agreement, our links and interactions with the United Nations and its programmes, funds and specialized agencies are developing even further, and options for enhanced cooperation and support are under review. In order to fully contribute to the work of the United Nations family, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has requested full membership in the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) or the United Nations System's Chief Executives Board (CEB) as it has become since October 2001. The Preparatory Commission already participates in the work of the High Level Committees of the ACC but this participation cannot replace full membership in the main coordinating body. In light of the disarmament-related issues in the Millennium Declaration we feel it particularly important that the CTBTO

Preparatory Commission should be able to contribute fully to the work of the UN family.

15. We feel it is also important to report on our activities to the United Nations on a yearly basis. Fully aware of the wish of the General Assembly to rationalize its work, we believe that it would be of great significance for the General Assembly to be kept abreast of the rapid development of our new and growing organization on a closer basis. In times of increasing concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the reports of organizations specialized in this field should be of particular relevance to the deliberations of the General Assembly.

16. In closing, I would like to emphasize that, five years after its opening for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has the confirmed support of the international community, and is recognized as playing an important role in nuclear disarmament and in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The developing verification regime is ever more accurate in pinpointing the location of events, and, in addition, the data already available to States Signatories, both in 'raw' and processed forms, can have valuable civil and scientific uses. As was unanimously declared by the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which took place here at United Nations Headquarters just three weeks ago, we call upon all States to take steps to ensure that the CTBT enters into force as soon as possible. By signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, States join a global community committed to ensuring that the world becomes a safer place for generations to come.