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**Address by the Executive Secretary  
Of the Preparatory Commission for the  
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

**Mr. Tibor Tóth**

**Fifth CTBT Ministerial Meeting  
(NY, 23 September 2010)**

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I would like to thank the convenor countries for their commitment to the CTBT. Their untiring support for the Treaty's noble goals is a source of inspiration. The presence of so many ministers and senior delegates in this meeting is a reminder that multilateralism has not withered away. It is a reminder that multilateral action to face common challenges is indeed still possible. And it is a reminder that it is perhaps the only way forward in a world of increasing complexity.

When this meeting last convened in 2008, there were serious concerns about prospects for multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation. Renewed optimism exists today about our future and prospects for entry into force of the treaty. More states have signed and ratified. At least two Annex two states have renewed their commitment to ratify in an expedited way. The ratification by all the remaining Annex 2 states remains the legal requirement for entry into force. At the same time the signature and ratification of all States that have not yet done so will provide important momentum towards this goal. It is an expression of global confidence in the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

This meeting underscores the international community's commitment to CTBT. It complements the highly successful Conference to promote the entry into force of the CTBT held here in New York in September 2009. In a consensus declaration, hold-out States were called on to sign and ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force. The declaration was supported by the non-ratifying states China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the US. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented this robust collective message at the doorstep of the Security Council Summit. In turn, the Council called for the entry into force of the Treaty at an early date.

A few short months ago, the 2010 NPT Review Conference overcame the failure of 2005. The NPT received a renewed lease to life. The Review Conference affirmed the vital importance of the entry into force of the CTBT as a core element of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. NPT states agreed that the treaty plays a significant role in constraining the development of nuclear weapons, as well as the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability.

It is imperative that we implement these undertakings. There is no shortcut. The CTBT can only exist with a strong NPT regime. But to sustain the NPT, it has to be underpinned by the CTBT regime.

The treaty already plays a key role to play in today's security environment. It is a rallying point along the road to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is a strong and verifiable final barrier to a nuclear weapons capability. The treaty can only enter into force once the remaining nine Annex 2 states have ratified. These states must ask themselves: Is it better to keep the door open for testing in the future? Or should a permanent cap be placed on the development of nuclear weapons by possessors and non-possessors alike?

To sum up, the norm already exists. It has been signed by 182 and ratified by 153 states. Its verification system has been tried and tested. The system is 80% complete. It is all inclusive, multilateral and democratic.

Renewed impetus exists today for nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. The political will of the international community is evident. It is high time to translate political will into concrete action. We do not have the luxury of time. Our action, or lack thereof will define how our security will look like for decades to come. A situation where only a few states prevent the solemn aspiration of the rest of the world to forever ban nuclear testing is clearly not sustainable.

I therefore call on the remaining Annex 2 states to consider this: How can even their own security be guaranteed without a qualitative cap on nuclear weapons and their reduction? Or could it be that all of them and all of us will end up with less security? We have to bring this treaty in force.